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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : District Court No. 081901837 
LLOYD FRANKLIN VIT, : Appellate Court No. 20100710 
Defendant/Appellant. : _ _ _ _ ^ ^ 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Appellant is appealing from a Judgment, Sentence and Commitment of 
the Second District Court for Weber County, Utah, dated November 12, 2010. The 
Defendant was convicted of Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted 
Person, a third-degree felony in violation of U.C.A. §76-10-503; and Possession of 
a Controlled Substance, a third-degree felony in violation of U.C.A. §58-37-8. He 
was sentenced by the Honorable Scott Hadley to two terms of zero to five years in 
the Utah State Prison. Jurisdiction for the Appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court 
of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. §78A-4-103(2)(j). 
POINT I 
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF 
1 
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THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, 
SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION WHEN HIS ATTORNEY FAILED MAKE A 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED 
AFTER AN ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE 
DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Appellate Court must determine as a 
matter of fact and law whether the Defendant was denied his right to effective 
assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 
(1984), the United States Supreme Court articulated a two part test, which was 
adopted in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine whether 
counsel was ineffective. The Court held that; 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must 
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Id. at 466 
U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693 
POINT II 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN 
FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE DEFENDANT'S 
PROPERTY HAD BEEN ILLEGALLY SEARCHED BY THE 
POLICE? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was not properly preserved for 
appeal; therefore, the plain error standard applies. "To establish plain error, a 
2 
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defendant must show: (1) an error did in fact occur, (2) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is harmful." State v. Bradley, 2002 UT 
App 348 (See also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) and 
State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993).) 
POINTIII 
WAS THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED AFTER THE 
DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY WAS ILLEGALLY SEARCHED 
AND SEIZED FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE AND 
THEREFORE SHOULD IT HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was not fully and properly preserved 
for appeal, and therefore the plain error standard applies. "To establish plain error, 
a defendant must show: (1) an error did in fact occur, (2) the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is harmful. State v. Bradley, 2002 
UT App 348 (See also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) 
and State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Fourth Amendment 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
3 
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Sixth Amendment 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, 
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in 
his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defen(s)e. 
Fourteenth Amendment 
Section 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article 1, Section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Article 1, Section 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted 
by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance 
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of 
the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. 
Article 1 Section 14: [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of 
warrant] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant 
4 
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shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§58-37A-5. Unlawful acts. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, 
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who 
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor 
§58-37-8(2)(a)(i) Possession of a Controlled Substance Prohibited acts — 
Penalties. 
It is unlawful: for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under 
a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course 
of his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
§76-6-408- Receiving stolen property — Duties of pawnbrokers, secondhand 
businesses, and coin dealers. 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property of 
another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has been 
stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or 
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, 
intending to deprive the owner of it. 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the case of 
an actor who: 
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a separate 
occasion; 
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the receiving 
offense charged; 
(c) is a pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in or 
collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, 
5 
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employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or 
obtains property and fails to require the seller or person delivering the property to: 
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the property; 
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the bottom of the 
certificate next to his signature; and 
(iii) provide at least one positive form of identification; or 
(d) is a coin dealer or an employee of the coin dealer as defined in Section 13-32a-
102 who does not comply with the requirements of Section 13-32a-104.5. 
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in or 
collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every agent, 
employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to comply with 
the requirements of Subsection (2)(c) is presumed to have bought, received, or 
obtained the property knowing it to have been stolen or unlawfully obtained. This 
presumption may be rebutted by proof. 
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears from the evidence that the 
defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates a business dealing in 
or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, or was an 
agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or person, that the defendant 
bought, received, concealed, or withheld the property without obtaining the 
information required in Subsection (2)(c) or (2)(d), then the burden shall be upon 
the defendant to show that the property bought, received, or obtained was not 
stolen. 
(5) Subsections (2)(c), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap metal processors as 
defined in Section 76-10-901. 
(6) As used in this section: 
(a) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling goods. 
(b) "Pawnbroker" means a person who: 
(i) loans money on deposit of personal property, or deals in the purchase, 
exchange, or possession of personal property on condition of selling the same 
property back again to the pledge or depositor; 
(ii) loans or advances money on personal property by taking chattel mortgage 
security on the property and takes or receives the personal property into his 
possession and who sells the unredeemed pledges; or 
(iii) receives personal property in exchange for money or in trade for other 
personal property. 
(c) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on the 
security of the property. 
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§76-10-503 Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person. 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(b) A Category II restricted person is a person who: 
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in Section 58-37-2; 
(iv) is in possession of a dangerous weapon and is knowingly and intentionally 
in unlawful possession of a Schedule I or II controlled substance as defined in 
Section 58-37-2; 
(3) A Category II restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or 
has under his custody or control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
§78A-4-103(2)(j). Court of Appeals Jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
RULE 402. RELEVANT EVIDENCE GENERALLY ADMISSIBLE; 
IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or 
by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is 
not relevant is not admissible. 
RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF 
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
7 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was initially charged in an information dated August 30, 2005, 
with Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a third-degree 
felony in violation of U.C.A. §76-10-503, Illegal Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, a third-degree felony in violation of U.C.A. §58-37-8, and Possession 
of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B Misdemeanor in violation of U.C.A. §58-37A-5. 
All three charges were later dismissed without prejudice on October 31, 2005. The 
State moved forward on a related charge (all events took place on the same date of 
August 29, 2005) of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a second-degree Felony 
in violation of U.C.A. §76-6-408, filed in an information dated September 29, 
2005. Defendant's private attorney filed a motion to suppress the evidence; and 
prior to the oral arguments, the State reduced the charge to a class A misdemeanor 
and no motion was argued. Defendant was sentenced on that charge on November 
28, 2006. The State then refilled an information on August 27, 2008, that charged 
Defendant with the current charges of Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a 
Restricted Person, in violation of U.C.A. §76-10-503 and Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, in violation of U.C.A. §58-37-8 both third-degree felonies 
that arose from the same August 29, 2005, incident 
On December 4, 2008, Defendant made an initial appearance to the court. 
The case was continued until Defendant retained attorney Gary Gale. Defendant 
8 
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and his attorney were proceeding until Mr. Gale passed away in the fall of 2009. 
The case was then transferred to multiple attorneys, private and public defenders, 
until January 26, 2010, in which his current public defender was assigned. The 
public defender moved the case forward from the pre-trial stage and set the matter 
for trial. No motions were ever filed. 
Defendant and his Defense Counsel held a jury trial on July 29, 2010 in 
which Defendant was convicted of both charges. Defendant was sentenced to two 
terms of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison. Defendant is currently in the 
Utah State Prison. 
This judgment and conviction was entered on November 1, 2010, and 
Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal on November 12, 2010. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 29, 2005, Officer Thomas from the Ogden City Police 
Department was called by an employee of Staker Parsons (a local construction 
company) stating they believed they saw a backhoe which had been stolen. (R. 
149/104-105) The employee took Officer Thomas to the location where the 
backhoe could be seen from the freeway, and Officer Thomas began to drive to 
where this property was located in Marriot/Slaterville. (R. 149/105) When Officer 
Thomas arrived to the property, there was a gate to the property which was locked. 
(R. 149/105) Officer Thomas was able to speak with an individual who informed 
9 
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him that the parcel of property which the backhoe was on belonged to Defendant. 
(R. 149/105) 
Officer Thomas went back onto that property, past the locked gate, and was 
still unable to make any contact with the owner. (R. 149/106, 113) Officer Thomas 
then went to within 15-20 feet of the backhoe, and obtained the V.I.N. number on 
the backhoe. He was kept back the 15-20 feet from the backhoe due to a watchdog 
that was on a chain. (R. 149/106) No one gave Officer Thomas permission to enter 
Defendant's property at that time. (R. 149/112) Officer Thomas ran the V.I.N. 
number on the N.C.I.C. and found the backhoe was listed as stolen. (R. 149/107) 
Officer Thomas then left a detective on the premise and went to the station to write 
a search warrant. (R. 149/107) Officer Thomas never completed the search warrant 
and returned to the premise, without a warrant, based upon information that 
Defendant had returned home. (R. 149/107) Officer Thomas spoke with Defendant 
and asked if he had consent to go look at the backhoe on his property. Officer 
Thomas stated Defendant consented. (R. 149/108) 
Officer Thomas continued to speak with Defendant and asked if they could 
go into his trailer to talk. Defendant allowed the officers (Thomas, Grogan and 
Haney) to go into his trailer. (R. 149/109) After speaking with Defendant, Agent 
Haney went to obtain a search warrant, as he was currently investigating Defendant 
in regards to drug use and firearm possession. (R. 149/111,175) Upon obtaining a 
10 
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search warrant, officers searched the trailer. (R. 149/126, 128) Firearms and drug 
paraphernalia were found in the trailer as a result of the search. (R. 149/131) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This case stems from a citizen complaint of a possibility of a stolen backhoe 
on some private property. As a result of the complaint, the officer went onto 
Defendant's private property and illegally entered the property to retrieve 
identifying information from the backhoe. As a result, the officers then questioned 
Defendant about his trailer; and upon a subsequent search of Defendant's trailer, a 
firearm and a small amount of drugs were located. Defendant had retained private 
counsel who was able to file a suppression motion based upon the officer's illegal 
search of the property and reduce a second-degree felony charge to a misdemeanor. 
Based upon the considerable reduction, it is clear that the suppression motion had 
significant merit. 
As Defendant's present cases are resulting from the same illegal search of 
the property progressed, defense counsel failed to file a suppression motion on the 
issue although a motion was already prepared. Defendant and defense counsel 
continued to trial; and at trial, defense counsel made statements that the issue was 
important and questioned officers regarding their actions. Any evidence obtained 
after the illegal search constitutes fruit of the poisonous tree and should be 
excluded from evidence. However, due to trial counsel's failings, his attempt to 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
raise the illegal search at the time of trial was late and barred by the trial court. 
Based upon these failings, the Defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to 
effective assistance of counsel. Effective counsel would have timely researched, 
drafted, and filed appropriate suppression motions which would have resulted in an 
entirely different outcome of the case. 
A careful examination of the facts reveals that there was no reasonable 
suspicion or exigent circumstances that were present in this case. The officer had 
secured the scene, traveled back to the station to write the appropriate paperwork 
to obtain a magistrate issued search warrant, but then unilaterally changed his mind 
and decided to become the judge and simply search the premises without a 
warrant. Based upon defense counsel's failure to raise such issues at the 
appropriate level, Defendant's Utah and U.S. Constitutional right to unreasonable 
searches and seizures was violated, along with his constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF 
THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, 
SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION WHEN HIS ATTORNEY FAILED TO MOVE 
THE COURT TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED AFTER 
12 
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AN ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE 
DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to counsel is 
the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 686, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692 (1984). In Strickland, the Supreme Court 
established a two-part test to determine whether counsel's assistance was 
ineffective. "First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel 
was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. Not 
objecting to constitutional violations rise to one of the greatest deficiencies of 
ineffective counsel. 
Similarly, this Court has required a two-step determination of ineffective 
assistance of counsel as set forth in the case of State v. King, 2010 UT App 396. % 
30, 248 P.3d 984, where the court required an inquiry into both "(1) whether 
counsel's perforaiance was deficient in that it "fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness'; and (2) whether counsel's performance was prejudicial in that 
'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.'" (Citations omitted). 
Furthermore, in the case of State v. Mecham, 2000 UT App 247, \ 22, 9 P.3d 777, 
the Court further defined the first prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel test 
13 
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by requiring that, "[b]efore we will reverse [a defendant's] conviction based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel, he must prove there was a 'lack of any 
conceivable tactical basis'for counsel's actions." 
In the case of Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365 (1986), the Court was 
presented with a case almost identical to the case at bar where defense counsel, due 
to a failure to conduct proper discovery, did not timely file a motion to suppress 
evidence under the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed his 
conviction under an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Supreme Court 
affirmed that reversal. In that affirmation of reversal the Court stated: 
Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment 
claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the 
defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is 
meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict 
would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to 
demonstrate actual prejudice. {Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 
365,375(1986)) 
In making the determination that trial counsel's conduct failed to comport with 
constitutional requirements the Court held: 
In this case, however, we deal with a total failure to conduct pretrial 
discovery, and one as to which counsel offered only implausible 
explanations. Counsel's performance at trial, while generally 
creditable enough, suggests no better explanation for this apparent 
and pervasive failure to "make reasonable investigations or to make 
a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations 
unnecessary." [citation omitted] Under these circumstances, 
although the failure of the District Court and the Court of Appeals to 
examine counsel's overall performance was inadvisable, we think 
this omission did not affect the soundness of the conclusion both 
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courts reached — that counsel's performance fell below the level of 
reasonable professional assistance in the respects alleged. 
{Kimmelmanv. Morrrison, All U.S. 365, 386 (1986)) 
Quite similarly, in the instant case, the Defendant's trial counsel also 
neglected to file any motions to suppress evidence derived from the illegal search 
and seizure of the property. Further, defense counsel had access to a suppression 
motion filed by Defendant's private counsel, which clearly had merit based upon 
the State agreeing to reduce a charge from a second-degree felony to a class A 
misdemeanor. Defense counsel further recognized the issue was important during 
the trial when, upon cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Officer 
Thomas regarding the entrance of the property. (R. 149/112) Defense counsel 
questioned as follows: 
Defense Counsel Q: Now, you've testified that nobody was on the 
property where this backhoe was sitting, that you checked with the 
neighbors, you came back and then you were able to get close enough 
to look at the backhoe, you entered onto Mr. Vit's property; is that 
correct? , 
Officer John Thomas A: That's correct. 
Q. And who gave you permission to do that? 
A. No one. 
Q. So you just helped yourself? 
Prosecutor: Your Honor, I'm going to object. I don't know what the 
relevance of this is. 
15 
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Court: Mr. Marshall? 
Defense counsel: Well, it's the beginning of a whole long process of 
searching, this is where it began. This was the probable cause from 
them to do everything that started from that point forward. 
Prosecutor: But the problem is, if this is an argument as to his ability 
to be out at the premises, I mean, that's a motion and an argument that 
should have been brought a long time ago, not during trial. 
(R. 149/112-113) 
Although defense counsel was permitted to continue with the line of 
questioning, it is clear that both the State and defense counsel recognized the issue 
was pertinent as to the probable cause for the rest of the search (R. 149/113), yet 
the legal argument was not brought forth in a motion by defense counsel. 
Further, upon questioning of Officer Haney, Officer Haney stated that he 
had been investigating Defendant for narcotics activity. (R. 149/175) Officer 
Haney further stated, "This had been a year-long investigation for me, I was 
waiting for something, you know, to happen. I'd been building up probable cause 
to eventually gain the possibility of a search warrant or some type of access on his 
property to try and close this case out. When I heard that there was officers out 
there, I decided to go out and see what was going on." (R. 149/176) Clearly Officer 
Haney had been investigating and had been trying to reach the level of probable 
cause to get a warrant for Defendant's property. However, Officer Haney was 
unable to do so based upon the information he had himself. Had Officer Thomas 
not illegally entered the property to see the VIN number of the backhoe, no 
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probable cause would have existed in this case according to both Officer Haney's 
and Officer Thomas'testimony. 
Counsel failed to object to the admission of the methamphetamine and 
firearms as fruit of the poisonous tree. Counsel's performance may have been 
'creditable enough' during the trial, but the overall performance from pretrial 
discovery to the end of the jury trial was utterly deficient, and his failure ought to 
have been recognized by the trial court. Trial counsel's performance rises to the 
level of ineffective assistance of counsel which was discussed in Kimmelman v. 
Morrison, All U.S. 365 (1986). 
In the case of State v. King, 2010 UT App 396, |30, 248 P.3d 984, this Court 
reversed the conviction of a defendant whose trial counsel allowed the prosecutor 
in closing arguments to mischaracterize critical evidence. Furthermore defense 
counsel, for no explainable reason thereafter embraced the mischaracterization, 
effectively admitting to the jury the defendant had committed the offense charged. 
In a case almost identical to the present case, the Court in State v. Gallegos, 
961 P.2d 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), found that the failure of trial counsel to object 
to a Fourth Amendment violation constituted error, as well as established 
reversible ineffective assistance of counsel. In that case, the Court applied the 
Strickland test to a situation where defense counsel had, in a pretrial motion, 
moved to suppress evidence on the basis of an illegal search. The trial court denied 
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that motion based upon evidence at a preliminary hearing. During trial the officer 
altered his testimony establishing the lack of plain view, yet trial counsel did not 
re-raise the motion to suppress. The Court held that, "where a defendant can show 
that there was no conceivable legitimate tactical basis for counsel's deficient 
actions, the first prong of Strickland is satisfied." (Id. at 976, quoting State v. 
Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).) 
Defense counsel's error in the present case was glaringly obvious to any 
observer. His failure to object to and have a hearing on the seizure of the 
Defendant's property clearly showed a deficiency. In Kimmelman v. Morrison 
infra., the Court found reversible error in a case where trial counsel realized a 
Fourth Amendment issue, but brought it to the courts attention in an untimely 
manner. That untimely motion alone constituted reversible error. In State v. 
Gallegos infra., the Court found error in trial counsel's failure to renew a 
previously denied motion to suppress. In the present case, counsel, as in 
Kimmelman, failed to make a timely motion to suppress a Fourth Amendment 
violation, even though counsel had access to the suppression motion. 
Furthermore, "Counsel's performance at trial . . . suggests no better 
explanation for this apparent and pervasive failure." {Kimmelman) To the contrary, 
there is absolutely no conceivable reason for defense counsel not to make a pre-
trial motion to suppress this evidence. Defense counsel was aware of the 
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significance of the issue and could have moved for a continuance to file and argue 
the motion. However, trial counsel's lack of reading the file resulted in a highly 
prejudicial error to Defendant. Since this motion should have been brought prior 
to trial, even the possible fear of somehow prejudicing the jury would be non-
existent. 
The second prong of the two-part test articulated in Strickland is "the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant 
of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 
687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
In Stiickland, the Court held that "[t]he purpose of the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to 
justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding." In State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 
182 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court held that to meet the second part of the 
Strickland test a defendant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." Id. at l$7(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 694 (1984)). In making the determination that counsel was ineffective the 
appellate court should "consider the totality of the evidence, taking into account 
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such factors as whether the errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an 
isolated effect and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record." Id. 
Likewise, in State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 981 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), the 
court found prejudicial error in failing to object to the admission of a tin canister 
that contained drugs, which was found during an illegal search. In that case the 
court held: "Because the evidence found in the tin was essential to the State's case 
on [drug possession] charges, admission of that evidence was obviously prejudicial 
to defendant." Id 
In the present case, the error by defense counsel encompasses the "entire 
evidentiary picture." If trial counsel had raised the illegal search issue, and if the 
trial court had correctly ruled on that issue, all of the evidence obtained after such 
violation would have been suppressed. In this case, that means the entirety of the 
evidence that supported Defendant's conviction. These claims will be more fully 
argued and supported in points II and III below. 
When the totality of the circumstances is considered it is clear that the 
Defendant did not receive the type of assistance necessary to justify confidence in 
the outcome of the trial. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN 
FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE DEFENDANT'S 
PROPERTY HAD BEEN ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND 
SEIZED BY THE POLICE. 
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"To establish plain error, a defendant must show: (1) an error did in fact 
occur, (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is 
harmful. State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348 (See also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 
170, 174 (Utah Ct.App. 1992)) In the case of State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 
(Utah App. 1994)7 this Court held "Under [the plain error] standard, we will not 
reverse unless we determine that an error existed, and that the error was both 
obvious and harmful." The Court further ruled "An error is harmful if the 
likelihood of a different result is 'sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the 
verdict.'" (/Jat 1010) 
The first prong of the plain error test is showing that an error occurred. In 
the case oiKaupp v. Texas 538 U.S. 626 (U.S. 2003) the Supreme Court reiterated 
its long-standing position that the Fourth Amendment prohibits seizures of a 
person from a home. In Kaupp, the Court was presented with a situation where an 
officer who was investigating a murder went to the defendant's home at night; and 
after identifying himself, said "we need to go and talk". The defendant then said 
"OK," and the officer took him to the station for Mirandized questioning. 
The Court, in reversing the defendant's conviction stated: 
A seizure of the person within the meaning of the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments occurs when "taking into account all the 
circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would 
1
 Abrogated on other grounds by State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484, (Utah 1997) 
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4have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty 
to ignore the police presence and go about his business5." (Florida v. 
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 
486 U.S. 567,569(1988)) 
This Court in State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 17 (Utah App. 1993), further 
explained the rights individuals have on their property if they are not home and no 
warrant has been obtained. The Court explained that if a search is unrelated to the 
person, Terry is inapplicable. Id, The Beavers court went on to say that 
warrantless entries to property are justified with probable cause and exigent 
circumstances because in such circumstances, the delay to obtain a search warrant 
would risk "physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of 
relevant evidence, [or] the escape of the suspect." United States v. Lindsey, 877 
F.2d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 
1199 (9th Cir. 1984)). In contrasting it with the Terry Doctrine, which allows for 
searches of the person if an officer believes criminal activity may be afoot, the 
Beavers Court stated, "That risk is diminished in the residential setting because the 
person police wish to question is located in a dwelling that can generally be staked 
out until the person emerges, if a polite knock at the door fails to produce a suspect 
willing to voluntarily answer police inquiries." State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9. The 
Beavers court went on to state, "Accordingly, we reject the State's argument that 
police can enter a dwelling without a warrant on the basis of reasonable suspicion. 
2
 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.C. 1868 (U.S. Ohio 1968) 
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An extension of the Teny doctrine to warrantless entries of private premises is 
contrary to Fourth Amendment principles." State v. Beavers 859 P.2d 9, 17 (Utah 
App. 1993) 
In the present case, there was no reasonable suspicion present. Further, 
Officer Thomas could have (and in fact did) stake out the premises until Defendant 
returned home before he went onto the property. There was no risk that the items 
would be destroyed or that any exigent circumstance occurred. Certainly an object 
is large is a backhoe would be impossible to destroy and difficult and time-
consuming to remove. Additionally, if the Defendant came in and tried to move 
the backhoe off the property, the officer could then arrest for driving a non-
licensed vehicle on the street. Instead, Officer Thomas violated Defendant's Fourth 
Amendment rights when he unlawfully went through the gate on Defendant's 
property to access the backhoe. 
The protection of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution has long been 
upheld in all areas. The Utah Court of Appeals, in the case of State v. Burningham, 
2000 UT App. 229, reversed the conviction of a defendant who was seized and 
searched at a friend's cabin by a police officer acting without a warrant. This 
reversal was in spite of the fact that the defendant was on probation, and the officer 
was following up on a tip that the defendant possessed illegal drugs. The Court 
held: "Thus, the search - supported only by reasonable suspicion - violated the 
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appellant's Fourth Amendment rights." (Id at 357) See also State v. Valenzuela, 
2001 UT App 332. The Court reversed a defendant's conviction where he was 
stopped in a public bank based upon a tip from an unknown informant that the 
defendant had committed a forgery. The defendant was arrested (level III), and a 
search revealed a controlled substance. The Court determined that a reasonable 
officer under the circumstances could not have had reasonable suspicion to believe 
that the defendant had committed an offense; therefore, the seizure was 
unconstitutional. 
In the U.S. Supreme Court case of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347(1967), the Court stated that, pursuant to a two-pronged inquiry, the 
determination of Fourth Amendment protections hinges on "a twofold nature 
requirement, first, that a person had exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy and second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable." Id. 
In the case at bar, Defendant's person was not initially seized, rather his 
property was searched and seized in an illegal manner without Defendant present 
nor was reasonable suspicion or exigent circumstances present. Officer Thomas 
admitted he was not given permission to enter into Defendant's property where the 
backhoe was located; rather Officer Thomas disregarded his training and the 
constitution and unlawfully went onto Defendant's property. (R. 149/112) 
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Defendant's property was protected by a gate, which is the type of privacy the Katz 
court spoke about. It is not unreasonable for individuals to have an expectation of 
privacy in their home and their land which is protected by a gate. Officer Thomas' 
actions were needless, as he could have staked out the residence and waited for 
Defendant to return home, as discussed in State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9. The first 
prong of the plain error test has been met as Officer Thomas' actions did violate 
Defendant's Fourth Amendment constitutional rights. 
What is probably most troubling is the fact that Officer Haney testified that 
he had been watching the Defendant for some time yet did not have sufficient 
evidence to justify approaching a magistrate for a warrant. What is even more 
troubling, however, is that Officer Thomas, after trespassing on Defendant's 
property and illegally obtaining the VIN number from the backhoe, went back to 
his office to draft up the requisite documents for a warrant and then decided that he 
would disregard the Constitution and unilaterally declare himself judge and 
proceed to go back to the property to search the premises without even attempting 
to obtain a warrant. It is these types of violations that have troubled appellate 
courts in the past, and have resulted in the adoption of an exclusionary rule. (See 
Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (U.S. 1961), where the United States 
Supreme Court applied the previously instituted exclusionary rule to the States 
based upon a factual scenario very similar to the case at hand.) 
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It is an officer's blatant disregarded the Constitution, where he enters upon 
private property and takes upon himself a decision to search the defendant's home 
without obtaining a warrant, simply because he is an officer, has a gun, and he can 
do it, that has troubled Appellate Courts in prior cases. It is this type of disregard 
of the sacrosanct provisions of the Constitution that have necessitated the 
institution of exclusionary rule in the past, and continue to demonstrate the 
beneficial effect of exclusionary rule can have to bridle officers who trample on the 
Constitution. 
The final prong of the plain error test is harm. The Court has held that, "An 
error is harmful if the likelihood of a different result is 'sufficiently high to 
undermine confidence in the verdict.'" (State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah 
App. 1994).) In the present case, the error by defense counsel encompasses the 
"entire evidentiary picture". {Strickland v. Washington, infra.) If trial counsel had 
raised the illegal seizure issue, and if the trial court had correctly ruled on that 
issue, all of the evidence obtained after such violation would have been 
suppressed. In this case, that means the entirety of the evidence that supported 
Defendant's conviction. Officer Haney stated he had been waiting for additional 
evidence, which was needed for a search warrant. (R. 149/176) There was no other 
evidence which would have allowed for a warrant or for a search of the premise; 
therefore, harm was a result of defense counsel's failure to raise the issue. 
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The harm in the present case is very similar to that set forth by this Court in 
the case of State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 981 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), where the 
Court found prejudicial error in failing to object to the admission of a tin canister 
that contained drugs, which was found during an illegal search. In that case the 
court held: "Because the evidence found in the tin was essential to the State's case 
on [drug possession] charges, admission of that evidence was obviously prejudicial 
to defendant." Likewise, in the present case, if the Court determines that defense 
counsel should have filed a suppression motion, and the evidence would support 
the trial court's granting of that motion, the prejudice to the Defendant is 
staggering and obvious. If the suppression motion was successful, the prosecution 
would be unable to go forward on the case, and the prejudice to the Defendant is 
therefore unquestioned. 
POINTIII 
THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED AFTER THE DEFENDANT'S 
PROPERTY WAS ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND SEIZED 
CONSTITUTES FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE AND 
THEREFORE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED. 
Once this Court has established that there was a constitutionally 
impermissible seizure of the Defendant, the next issue is to what extent does this 
constitutional violation effect the subsequent evidence. In the case of Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963), the U.S. Supreme Court stated, 'The 
exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials 
27 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion." The Court 
further reinforced the gravity of Fourth Amendment protections of the person by 
stating: 
In order to make effective the fundamental constitutional guarantees 
of sanctity of the home and inviolability of the person, Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616, this Court held nearly half a century ago that 
evidence seized during an unlawful search could not constitute proof 
against the victim of the search. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383. 
The exclusionary prohibition extends as well to the indirect as the 
direct products of such invasions. {Wong Sun v. United States, at 484) 
The Utah Courts have likewise followed the fruit of the poisonous tree 
doctrine. In the case of State v. Deherrera, 965 P.2d 501, 505 (Utah App. 1998) 
this Court held: 
Absent an exception to the exclusionary rule, Mapp requires us to 
exclude "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of 
the Constitution." Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655, 81 S.Ct. at 1691. There is 
no dispute that the stop of defendant at the Tibbie Fork Canyon traffic 
checkpoint was unconstitutional. Nor is there any dispute that, absent 
the good faith exception, all evidence obtained subsequent to 
defendant's stop should be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417, 
9L.Ed.2d441 (1963). 
All of the evidence gathered against the Defendant in the present case stems from 
the initial illegal seizure and subsequent search of the Defendant's property. The 
Defendant's property should not have been entered without a search warrant. The 
officers in the present case had no warrant, and their entry upon the property 
violated Defendant's protections against unreasonable searches. Had the illegal 
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entry onto Defendant's premise never occurred, the subsequent encounters and 
search of his trailer would not have occurred and no evidence of drugs or firearms 
would have been discovered. There was no reasonable suspicion, and any evidence 
gathered against the Defendant after an unconstitutional search ought to be entirely 
suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant respectfully requests this court 
reverse the Defendant's conviction and remand for a new trial. 
DATED this 15th day of Julv 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs , 
LLOYD FRANKLIN VIT, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
DISTRICT COURT MINUTES 
APP SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 0819.01837 FS $/?!/ 
J u d g e : SCOTT M HADLEY $2 
D a t e : November 1, 2 010 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lauries 
Prosecutor: LYON, NATHAN D 
Defendant 
D e f e n d a n t ' s A t t o r n e y (s) : RANDALL L MARSHALL, PD 
A g e n c y : A d u l t P r o b a t i o n & P a r o l e 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
D a t e of b i r t h : March 1 5 , 1953 
A u d i o 
Tape Number: 3D110110 Tape Count; 3:31-3:42 
CHARGES 
1, PURCH/POSS DANGEROUS WEAPON - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 07/29/2010 Guilty 
2.. POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 07/29/2010 Guilty 
HEARING 
This is the time set for Adult Probation and Parole sentencing. 
The defendant is present and is represented by Randall Marshall. 
Respective counsel and the defendant address the Court. 
The Court finds no legal reason why sentence' should not be 
imposed. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of PURCH/POSS DANGEROUS WEAPON 
a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate 
term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
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Case No: 081901837 Date: Nov 01, 2010 
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE 
VITT 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of PURCH/POSS DANGEROUS WEAPON 
a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 12 0 
day(s) 
Credit is granted for time served. 
Credit is granted for 5 day(s) previously served. 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
Sentence may be served in the jail's work release/restitution 
program. 
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Sentences to run concurrent with each other and concurrent with any 
other sentences. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $5000.00 
Suspended: $444.5.00 
Surcharge: $2 SB. 5.1 
Due: $555.00 
Charge # 2 Fine 
Suspended 
Surcharge 
$5000.00 
$5000.00 
$ 
Total Fine 
Total Suspended 
Total Surcharge 
Total Principal Due 
$10000.00 
$9445.00 
$268.51 
$555.00 
Plus Interest 
Attorney Fees Amount: $500.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: WEBER COUNTY TREASURER 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 3.6 month (s) . 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 12 0 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 555.00 which includes the surcharge, 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
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Case No: 081901837 Date: Nov 01, 2010 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
The defendant shall enter into an agreement with the Utah State 
Department of Adult Probation & Parole and comply strictly with its 
terms and conditions. 
The defendant shall report to the Department of Corrections and to 
the court whenever required. 
The defendant shall violate no law, either federal, state or 
municipal. 
The defendant shall successfully complete a substance abuse 
evaluation and any treatment deemed necessary by Adult Probation & 
Parole, paying all costs. 
The defendant shall obtain and maintain lawful, full-time, 
verifiable employment. 
"The defendant shall successfully complete a theft counseling 
program under the direction of Adult Probation & Parole, paying all 
costs. 
The defendant shall successfully complete the Thinking for a Change 
program through Adult Probation & Parole or some other type of 
cognitive restructuring program., paying all costs. 
The defendant shall provide a DNA .sample-, to be obtained by Adult 
Probation & Parole, and pay all costs. 
The defendant shall abide by a 7:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. curfew for 
the first 90 days after release from jail, which may be modified by 
the probation agent. 
The defendant shall submit to warrantless search, seizure and 
chemical testing. 
The defendant shall not use or possess controlled substances or be 
in the presence of those who use, possess, manufacture or 
distribute controlled substances. 
The defendant shall pay the following financial, obligations through 
Adult Probation and Parole.: 
a) $555 fine 
b) $500 public defender fee 
Date.: //~r-'/0 
'SCOTT M H A D L E Y S 
District Court Judge 
Page 3 (last) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
